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Abstract
United States law charges America’s asylum officers with 
providing humanitarian protection for refugees while simul-
taneously securing the nation from external threats. This 
mandate requires that asylum officers balance potentially 
conflicting claims as they seek to ensure just treatment of 
claimants. This article explores how officers charged with 
that responsibility can develop a regime-centred subjectiv-
ity that often conditions them to view applicants with fraud 
and security concerns foremost in mind. This analysis also 
examines the potential efficacy of practical strategies linked 
to aesthetic, cognitive, affective, and moral imagination that 
may allow officials to become more aware of their state-
centred subjectivity and how it influences their perceptions 
of threats to national security and to fraud. This analysis 
encourages adjudication officers to strive for a more nuanced 
understanding of what constitutes fraud and national secur-
ity concerns and what are instead presuppositions created 
by the United States population-protection agenda.
Résumé
La loi aux États-Unis investit les agents préposés aux 
demandes d’asile avec la responsabilité d’accorder la pro-
tection humanitaire aux réfugiés et en même temps de 
protéger le pays des dangers venant de l’extérieur. Un tel 
mandat nécessite que les agents réconcilient des exigences 
potentiellement conflictuelles tout en assurant un traite-
ment équitable des demandeurs. Cet article étudie le pro-
cessus selon lequel les agents chargés de cette responsabilité 
peuvent développer une subjectivité axée sur le régime qui 
les conditionne souvent à voir les demandeurs dans une 
perspective privilégiant la sécurité et la fraude. Également, 
cette analyse examine l’efficacité potentielle de straté-
gies pratiques liées à l’imagination esthétique, cognitive, 
affective, et morale qui pourraient rendre les agents plus 
conscients de leur subjectivité axée sur l’état et comment 
elle influe sur leurs perceptions de ce qui constitue un dan-
ger pour la sécurité nationale et un risque de fraude.
Introduction
United States law mandates that America’s asylum officers provide humanitarian protection for refu-gees and secure the nation from external threats. 
This charge requires these individuals, including the lead 
author of this article, who work for the United States Cit-
izenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), to balance 
potentially conflicting claims as they seek to ensure just 
treatment of claimants, many of whom have fled terrible 
conditions, while also protecting the United States from 
fraud and security threats. Asylum officers determine 
whether the facts of applicants’ cases justify classifying 
them as refugees under United States law. United States 
asylum law is derived in part from international accords 
that include the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol that extended both 
the temporal and geographic understanding of “refugee” 
among nations.1 The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) defines a refugee as an individual who has experienced 
persecution or has a well-founded fear of ill-treatment on 
account of a protected ground of political opinion, race, 
religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social 
group. The INA also provides the Department of Homeland 
Security authority to determine whether alien individuals 
meet this definition.
USCIS has many systems to ensure that officials accurately 
classify applicants and perform legally sufficient refugee 
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determinations. For example, asylum officers complete 
several weeks of residential training and four hours per 
week of continuing education on how to interpret relevant 
U.S. law. Administrators learn how to conduct thorough 
national security and fraud checks, who can be considered 
a refugee as well as how to process applications for so-called 
affirmative and defensive asylum applicants. In addition, a 
supervisor reviews every adjudication decision reached by 
an asylum official, and, in many cases, quality assurance 
specialists and/or second, third, and fourth reviewers may 
evaluate a decision as well. Asylum officers undergo exten-
sive training in legal standards of interpretation, psycho-
logical understanding of trauma victims, and sociological 
sensitivity to gender and culture. The goal of all these efforts 
is to guarantee that those qualifying are granted protection, 
while those pressing fraudulent claims or who constitute a 
threat to national security are denied that standing. USCIS 
officials are government employees, and their adjudication 
of refugee narratives occurs under the aegis of the regime. 
In consequence, how these individuals conceptualize their 
relationship with the state often remains hidden, despite the 
fact that “power and politics are inseparable from the pro-
cess of social construction that creates refugee systems.”2 As 
such, it is important to explore how refugee officials exercise 
state power and, in particular, to investigate how political 
forces may condition asylum determinations. As a result, 
it is useful to examine practices that asylum officers could 
employ to recognize and counter their state subjectivity.
State Sovereignty in Asylum Adjudication
A national approach to refugee protection through asylum 
makes the state invisible in that decision. That is, the gov-
ernment’s role in deciding the criteria on which asylum 
will be predicated is rarely questioned thereafter by those 
involved in refugee protection. As Beck has argued, “Meth-
odological nationalism assumes that nation, state and soci-
ety are ‘natural’ social and political forms of the modern 
world. It assumes a ‘natural’ division of humanity into a 
limited number of nations that organize themselves from 
within and demarcate themselves externally by drawing 
boundaries between themselves and other nations.”3 
He has contended that this assumption affects the ways in 
which individuals collect, interpret, and generate concepts 
and has challenged analysts to work outside this perspective 
to remain mindful that all regime processes are political and 
socially constructed. Viewing the individual asylum officer 
within the context of his or her position as state agent allows 
scholars to consider how these individuals are enmeshed in 
regime politics and “regain sovereignty and the ability to 
shape events through the nation state system.”4
Weber’s work concerning “simulating sovereignty” is 
useful when examining how asylum decision-makers 
regain/gain sovereignty in this sense.5 Weber has employed 
Foucault to contend “that some foundational truth under-
writes a particular organization of knowledge and that 
truth is not opposed to but is an effect of power.”6 She ques-
tions how “a search for meaning diverts attention from the 
production of meaning … in other words, [Weber raises the 
question of whether] interpretive communities [are] effects 
of discourses of truth and the workings of power.”7 Foucault 
posited that individuals enact certain discourses to repre-
sent state interests.8 Likewise, as asylum officers focus on 
the facts of cases to determine whether an individual fits 
the statutory definition of a refugee, their attention can be 
diverted from the state-centred power dynamics that influ-
ence how that understanding was produced.
Weber turned to Baudrillard to explore embedded, simu-
lated constructions of the state.9 She argued that the refer-
ent to which Foucault pointed is itself a constructed subject 
and that the state, the authoritative or represented power, is 
therefore simulated, because it cannot be a referent of itself. 
That is, Weber has contended the state and state boundaries 
constitute ideologies. Following this argument, one may sug-
gest that as United States asylum officers listen to narratives 
and decide who qualifies as a refugee, they represent not just 
state power, but also a process of simulation of the self as 
state, and the petitioner as an “other” outside the regime.
Legitimation is key to Weber’s theory of simulating 
sovereignty. She has suggested that individuals normal-
ize their understanding of the state by first determining 
who is outside the nation’s confines.10 For the refugee, this 
occurs through discursive legitimation through simulation. 
Weber has argued that a domestic community must be dif-
ferentiated from “other” groups and that disenfranchised 
individuals, including refugees, are constantly crossing the 
boundary of who is considered a member of such social con-
structs.11 In this sense, state boundaries, like the distinction 
one draws between citizens and non-citizens, can be seen 
as ideological structures. If one accepts Weber’s view that 
nation and state borders are created via regime arbiters who 
simulate and legitimate the state, one may also ask how this 
scenario shapes asylum narrative adjudication decisions. As 
Weber has observed, “Only by maintaining control over the 
depiction of its people can the state authoritatively claim to 
be the agent of its people. Without the ability to make cred-
ible its claims to both political and symbolic representation, 
the state risks forfeiting its presumed ability of representa-
tion and ultimately its sovereignty.”12
The analyst must examine the practices through which 
asylum officers gain and give power to the state when 
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applying Weber’s logic to adjudications. This in turn involves 
investigating how these officials make decisions and how 
they legitimate themselves by allying their choices with rep-
resentations of the state ideal and how that inclination affects 
their evaluations of asylum applications and narratives.
The Ethos, Pathos, and Logos of “Simulating” the 
State
Since asylum represents a metaphoric and legal unification 
with the state, identifying the avenues through which offi-
cials embody and perpetuate the regime when making this 
decision is important. For the same reason, it is helpful to 
illuminate steps that officers can take to dignify and respect 
applicants in that process. The USCIS officer constructs and 
simulates the state and the refugee by deciding which indi-
viduals attain protection, and by making decisions that shape 
policy implementation and influence law. However, asylum-
seekers are not the only actors discursively constructed in 
determination. The same is true of those interacting with 
them. Indeed, the refugee is “produced through a complex 
process of social construction involving ourselves.”13 To 
influence systems that define asylum recipients depends on 
“having access to formal authority, control over key resour-
ces, or the ability to discursively manage legitimacy.”14 As 
asylum officers determine the status of refugees, they solid-
ify their own standing as symbolic referents of the state.
An Aristotelian approach to examining how officers 
claim their standing as state representatives allows the 
analyst to view that process in terms of ethos, pathos, and 
logos-based appeals. In a classical Aristotelian argument, 
the audience is extremely important. A request may fail if 
spectators do not accept the legitimacy of the individual 
making a claim (ethos), if the contention is contrary to the 
beliefs of the audience (pathos), and/or if the onlookers do 
not accept the reasoning on offer (logos). Viewed this way, 
asylum officers simulate sovereignty through professional-
ization (state ethos), morality conditioning (governmental 
pathos), and legal interpretations (public logos).
The asylum officer simulates herself as the state and is 
legitimized as a regime arbiter by representing the govern-
ment ethos. In the process of professionalization as state 
worker, the official creates a boundary between herself and 
applicants, even as she represents herself as a sovereign 
United States decision-maker. Put differently, by profession-
alizing and following established and purportedly institu-
tionalized and routinized decision criteria, asylum officers 
“become” the state.
Professionalization begins even before the officer is 
offered a position, when she prepares herself with a gradu-
ate or law degree, fine-tunes social skills and organizational 
ability, and learns how to work within a bureaucratic 
structure. To attain a government post, individuals must 
fit the mould of a successful asylum officer. By obtaining 
a position as such, an official becomes a market success, as 
revealed by financial compensation, stable work, benefits, 
and opportunities for career progression. Officers adopt 
additional symbols of professionalization to adhere to state 
ethos, such as wearing a badge that signals authority and 
security clearance.
In addition to these physical manifestations of profes-
sionalization, asylum officials learn to navigate the U.S. 
government’s linguistic environment. For example, they 
master the language of the acronym: “PSG cases” (particular 
social group—a specific category of individuals that can be 
protected under United States law), “RAIO” (refugee, asylum, 
and international operations—the home of the Asylum Div-
ision within USCIS), and “CAT claims” (Convention against 
Torture—referring to a specific type of applicant asser-
tion). Officers must also become familiar with the agency’s 
governance structure. Professionalization legitimizes the 
individual as a power-holding government official. All of 
these capacities are simulations of state power that separate 
asylum-seekers and officers.
Asylum officers also simulate sovereignty and legitimize 
themselves as government arbiters by representing regime 
pathos. In doing so, they adopt a moral stance matching their 
employer’s (the nation’s) definition of refugee protection and 
of state authority within such decision-making. Officials 
learn to view themselves as insurers of refugee protection 
and of Americans’ safety. In some cases, this role may lead 
officers to define themselves as patriots, demarcating what is 
moral and immoral in international relations. In one now-
infamous historical incident, the MS St. Louis, a German 
ocean liner whose captain was seeking refuge for his 937 Jew-
ish passengers, was turned away from the United States in 1939 
and sent back to Europe, where more than a quarter of the 
ship’s travellers perished in Nazi concentration camps. Today, 
that choice seems outrageous, but in 1939, officials made the 
decision in the name of American state sovereignty.15 Often, 
however, such distinctions and judgments receive little public 
attention, and yet they are routinely drawn. President Lyndon 
Johnson, for example, explicitly welcomed asylum seekers 
from Cuba because U.S. policy-makers then perceived it as a 
threat to American security. The larger point is that United 
States leaders have always distinguished among groups when 
making asylum policy decisions.16 And like all policy, these 
choices are often informed as much by prejudice and prevail-
ing norms as by explicitly articulated criteria. They therefore 
change as popular sentiments and imaginaries shift.
During training, officers learn from torture survivors 
and also learn instances of national security and fraud 
breaches by unscrupulous applicants. Examples of both 
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helpless refugees and U.S. citizens harmed by terrorists play 
on officers’ compassion as well as hubris, and together these 
experiences work to justify their official role as protectors. 
Assuming the role of guardians of national sovereignty and 
security in turn “provides [officials] further justification of 
the determination process” and reinforces a fixed notion of 
what defines a refugee.17
Similarly, asylum officers adhere to state pathos by pre-
supposing the U.S. approach to international politics. USCIS 
asylum officers use and uphold the United States’ cause-
based approach to refugees. Instead of a cosmopolitan 
human rights–based method that views fundamental rights 
as grounds for asylum, the United States upholds a cause-
based conceptual frame for protection.18 This focus can steer 
asylum officers toward a stance of prosecutors and govern-
ment guarantors rather than seeking to ensure human rights 
and dignity for all applicants. So, for example, instead of 
seeing a fearful unaccompanied minor refugee from Central 
America as deserving basic human rights and potentially 
able to benefit from asylum, United States law and practice 
classify this person, using statist rhetoric, as a potential 
asylee, but also a possible national security threat. Put dif-
ferently, national security rhetoric on border protection and 
transgressors effectively criminalizes defensive-filing appli-
cants, which de facto erodes their basic human rights.19
Shemak has explored this tension in U.S. asylum law, and 
in the asylum officer role, thoughtfully and poignantly. As 
she has observed, “Asylum speaker testimonies rest upon 
their perceived truth-value. These testimonies reflect the 
confrontation between the nation-state and testimonial 
articulations as they are under constant scrutiny for their 
credibility, or lack thereof.”20
Even the resources that asylum officers employ as coun-
try-condition evidence reflect the government’s political 
agenda.21 Asylum decision-makers rely on reports produced 
by the Department of State and Western organizations to 
help them make “legally sufficient” decisions, but these 
analyses are designed foremost to protect the political and 
economic interests of America and its allies. For example, 
the United States 2013 country report on human rights 
regarding its United Kingdom ally noted, “Unsuccessful 
applicants for asylum and stateless persons are detained [in 
Britain] pending deportation,” without highlighting the fact 
that those individuals are often held as well before they are 
given a hearing, suggesting a U.S. effort to avoid censuring 
its partner as well as an effort to avoid revealing its own 
practices, which are identical.22
Also, rape and domestic violence alone have not histor-
ically been grounds for asylum in the United States. They 
have been viewed instead as types of harm that could befall 
a group that could be categorized as sufficient for protection. 
However, the identity of that group must be particular, 
immutable, and socially distinct.23 In consequence, “Perse-
cution that more closely resembles western discrimination 
against women, such as rape or domestic violence, is less 
readily regarded as political.”24 As such, instead of consid-
ering acts of rape or wartime rape as political violence, asy-
lum officers have often historically defined this scenario as 
not linked to a protected status outlined in legislation and 
international agreements. While this practice is changing 
with a recent landmark decision by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals finding that women who had been victims 
of domestic violence could be considered members of 
protected social groups, this fact highlights the centrality 
of state-centred criteria in officer discretionary decision-
making.25 Moreover, in day-to-day adjudication of specific 
cases, there is no space or place for asylum officials to con-
sider United States actions that could have contributed to 
the creation of refugees in the first place. Relevant law also 
does not ask whether the conditions confronting potential 
asylum-seekers constitute “an inevitable if unintended con-
sequence of the international state system.”26
Asylum officers also simulate themselves as state arbiters 
and legitimize their roles by representing state logos con-
cerning legal understandings of what qualifies an individual 
as an asylee. They are guided by requirements that “ensure 
that decisions are based on appropriate factors and correct 
application of the law.”27 USCIS officials translate refugee peti-
tion narratives into case facts and concentrate on determin-
ing whether an applicant’s story fits protection definitions as 
outlined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Code 
of Federal Regulations, and relevant case law. These analy-
ses employ country-of-origin information and “facts” to 
simplify complex narratives by sorting their elements into 
categories of supposed legal truths. In effect, asylum officers 
are “fix[ing] immigrant identities within networks of coded 
writing [to] perform instrumentalized readings of them.28 
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag have offered sev-
eral hypotheses concerning why there are wide differences 
among judicial asylum decision-makers in their decisions 
and contend that the statutory definitions are actually dif-
ficult to implement. For this reason, in their view, immigra-
tion judges, like asylum officers, depend inescapably, and in 
considerable measure, on disposition and judgment.29 They 
have argued, therefore, that individual decision-makers can 
and do play distinctive, determinative roles in the asylum 
program’s implementation and consequently its outcomes.30
Recognizing State Subjectivity and Breaking Down 
Binaries
The United States employs asylum officers, and these 
individuals serve the sovereign’s fraud-prevention and 
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security-assurance roles. Indeed, the regime delegates 
power to them to address those functions. However, a lack 
of awareness of the processes and implications of this mani-
festation of power through the officer’s state simulation 
may lead to an over-emphasis or an overly broad approach 
to fraud prevention and security prevention. If officials are 
able to understand their representations of state logos, ethos, 
and pathos, then on an analytic level at least, they can iden-
tify the constructs and boundaries that are created by the 
government and simulated in their day-to-day work and 
adjust their frame of understanding accordingly. If officers 
become more aware of their state-centred subjectivity and 
how it influences their perceptions of threats to national 
security and to fraud, they can better ensure that they are 
not casting too wide a net, or unnecessarily inflating sup-
posed risks. Instead, they can strive for a more nuanced 
understanding of what constitutes fraud and national 
security concerns and what are instead presuppositions cre-
ated by the United States population protection agenda.
Dawson has observed that the refugee claims “process 
necessarily overlooks the fact that all stories—regardless 
of whether or not they were designed to tell the truth—are 
imaginative constructs shaped by the words that are avail-
able (or not) to the teller, and by the context in which they 
are told, heard, or read.”31
Similarly, Powell has suggested that as displaced appli-
cants seeking asylum move across geographical space and 
time, the identities and realities of their narratives are ren-
dered more complex.32 As such, navigating the complicated 
reality of an applicant’s story and claim for asylum within 
discourses of state power may prove difficult. As asylum offi-
cials exercise their authority through simulations of profes-
sionalization and state morality and legality, they routinely 
define refugee identity, perhaps unconsciously, as outside of 
the regime and a potential threat not only to national sover-
eignty, but also to the state-centred, state-protector identity 
that officers simulate.
In interpreting refugee applicant stories, “we [asylum 
officers] ‘think like a state.’”33 Perhaps such officials are 
“hungering for the ‘coherent wholeness’ that will allow us, 
in effect, to process his [the applicant’s] claims, and to do so 
in a manner that demonstrates our altruism as the benefi-
cent gatekeepers of a benign and manifestly multicultural 
nation.”34 Although asylum administrators may view them-
selves as part of a humanitarian regime, their construction 
of themselves as state through simulations of professional-
ization, governmental morality, and legality instead creates 
boundaries between them and their petitioners and makes 
it more difficult for them to perceive and address the tension 
implicit in their roles as protectors of human rights and of 
security and sovereignty.
As Powell has noted, “Naming individuals as [refugees] 
is a way to mark them as other, and discursively binds them 
with narrative expectations of displacement … marking the 
displaced as other is a way of categorizing fears … so that 
the other remains at a distance from ourselves.”35
Indeed, the United States Asylum Division is charged 
with ensuring that there are no breaches to national security 
via fraud deterrence and detection. These aims are central 
to officers’ roles as state agents. This point was well made 
in a 2013 report on assessing applicant credibility in Euro-
pean Union asylum systems: “Societal and political context 
is concerned with preventing irregular immigration and 
ensuring that the asylum system is not abused by persons 
fabricating evidence. Some determining authorities are 
located in government departments that have the objective 
to prevent irregular immigration. This may influence the 
mind-set of decision-makers and make it more challenging 
to implement an institutional culture in asylum procedures 
that is adequately human rights and protection-oriented.”36
Asylum officers’ actions and decisions as adjudicators are 
tied to their state-centred subjectivity and they may there-
fore, presumably unconsciously, “other” applicants, perhaps 
even dehumanize them in their decision-making.
It seems reasonable to separate legitimate fraud concerns 
and the burnout among officers that may result from too 
often encountering individuals seeking to defraud the 
United States to gain entry, from our broader contention 
that asylum officials routinely enact state-centred criteria in 
their choices. While we recognize the problem of high levels 
of fraudulent claims, we want here to contend that that situ-
ation makes it all the more important that asylum officers 
be self-consciously aware of the in-principle claim for com-
passionate consideration of all petitioners notwithstanding. 
As the old saying goes, it is imperative not to throw the baby 
out with the bathwater if broader claims for due process and 
justice are to be served in the asylum adjudication process.
That is, responsible officials must be reflective and self-
aware so as to avoid falling into “thinking like a state” in 
binaries that categorize themselves as gatekeeper (whether 
of the burned out or newly minted variety) and asylum 
applicants as simply national security threats.37 As Bhandar 
and Dawson have observed, “Because of the extent to which 
the new normal involves construing migrants as a secur-
ity threat, any attempt to think critically about citizenship 
must begin ‘by taking the position that citizenship should 
be viewed from the position of the immigrant, migrant, or 
refugee.’”38
Taking this injunction seriously suggests a need for hol-
istic adjudications that humanize the individuals seeking 
refuge and a new construction of the “normal” of asylum 
officer representations of state ethos, pathos, and logos. 
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This involves breaking down nation-centred dichotomies 
and fixed categories of identity and truth grounded only in 
regime-grounded, structuralist understandings.
Moving from existing binaries requires that asylum 
officers employ creative conceptualizations. Many officers 
may do this subconsciously, but in order to draw conscious 
attention to state subjectivity, we can conceive creative con-
ceptualizations in the form of what Stephenson and others 
have described as imaginaries.39 Stephenson has argued that 
leaders must “understand the imaginaries or ways in which 
others are viewing the world,” and that they can do this by 
employing different “facets of imagination.”40 Stephenson 
quoted Green, who has observed that practising imagina-
tion “is to become able to break with what is supposedly 
fixed and finished, objectively and independently real. It 
is to see beyond what the imaginer has called normal or 
‘common sensible’ and to carve out new orders in experi-
ence.”41 Although officers may already enact imaginaries 
without consciously calling their processes “imaginaries,” 
Stephenson has identified four analytical facets of imagina-
tion—aesthetic, cognitive, affective, and moral—that can be 
employed to recognize, understand, rethink, and reframe 
asylum officer state-centred subjectivity.
Challenging State Subjectivity: Aesthetic 
Imagination
First, the form of imagination Stephenson dubbed “aes-
thetic” can be employed to “capture in a few words or a brief 
narrative or symbol a complex reality in order to obtain a 
connection and shared aspiration with those with whom 
they [leaders] are engaged.”42 This type of imagination can 
help officers avoid the trap of focusing foremost on fraud 
and national security concerns. Employing aesthetic practi-
ces offers an opportunity for decision-makers to recognize 
intricacies and complex symbols and metaphors present 
in petitioner stories and to use them to broaden narrow, 
engrained representational practices arising from the 
language of state security and protection.43 This can help 
USCIS officials look beyond the state discourse to engage 
applicant narratives more fully instead of fitting them into 
predefined legal categories. In employing aesthetic imagina-
tion, officers can consciously recognize key points of mean-
ing or components of the applicant’s story and the complex-
ities or different ways of knowing outside of official public 
discourse those narratives may convey.
For example, if an asylum officer is interviewing an appli-
cant who claims to be a victim of domestic violence and rape, 
but who could not give an accurate account of the number 
of times she had been raped, or why she did not leave her 
spouse, or why she had returned to that partner previ-
ously reporting the situation, an officer may come to the 
conclusion that her narrative was not sufficiently detailed 
and/or contradictory, and might consequently perceive the 
story as fraudulent, as it did not fit easily within the confines 
of what is generally regarded as credible testimony.
However, if one uses the lens of aesthetic imagination, 
one can imagine the complex realities and meanings that 
underlie the concept of rape, instead of classifying it simply 
as a type of harm that can rise to the level of persecution in 
certain situations. Rape is not just one harmful act; it is a 
violation of external and internal freedoms, an imposition 
of power, an act of shaming, a loss of freedom, and a psycho-
logical penetration, among other complexities. When an 
applicant testifies about a rape, officers can conceptualize 
the harm that the individual has experienced as involving 
multifaceted realities of power and consider that their inter-
play may influence the manner in which an asylum-seeker 
testifies. In effect, aesthetic imagination can help USCIS offi-
cials address complexities and intricate realities that do not 
otherwise accord neatly with established law and practice.
In addition to building more nuanced understandings 
of complex realities, aesthetic imagination can help officers 
identify symbols or metaphors in applicant narratives. Asy-
lum officials can analyze artwork, photography, poetry, or 
literature regarding refugee flight in order to problematize 
and render visible symbols of state politics/power. This may 
allow decision-makers to identify instances where supposed 
scientific thinking could overshadow important symbols 
in asylum applicant realities. For example, if a Congolese 
woman testifies that men in uniforms came to her house and 
raped her, but she is not able to offer more information, an 
asylum officer might find identifying the particular motiva-
tions behind the harm she experienced challenging and may 
consider the applicant insufficiently credible and/or not able 
to access a protected legal justification for asylum. However, 
if this same official had previously analyzed symbolism in a 
creative work relating to an experience of a Tutsi Congolese 
woman who was raped by Mai Mai militiamen, for example, 
he or she might be able to consider that the individual apply-
ing for asylum could have been a representation of purity to 
those fighters, and that by raping her, they were making a 
political statement. This understanding of what befell the 
woman might offer the officer expanded opportunities 
for questioning that could generate testimony involving a 
protected ground for asylum. Analysts have developed an 
extensive literature concerning the implications of trauma 
for asylum-seekers and particularly how such events may 
shape their presentation of self and demeanour during 
the application process. For present purposes, the analytic 
question is one of seeking to ensure officer sensitivity to 
these complex realities during consideration of individual 
narratives and cases.44
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Challenging State Subjectivity: Cognitive 
Imagination
Officers can also employ cognitive imagination in their deci-
sion processes, which Stephenson has suggested involves 
“[sorting] through complex concerns, [understanding] them, 
and [suggesting] mechanisms by which they might reason-
ably be addressed” or “offering alternative conceptions of 
shared purpose and processes.”45 This form of thinking 
requires expanding one’s frame to broaden collective “cap-
acity to understand the basic assumptions and claims that 
underpin the arguments and worldview of others pressing 
alternate claims and a companion ability to develop new 
analytic frames that transcend those.”46
For example, “The REAL ID Act,” which amended section 
208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, allowed officers 
to assess petitioners’ demeanour, candour, and responsive-
ness when determining the credibility of their claims.47 This 
charge raised the importance to case outcomes of officials’ 
perceptions of refugee physical and verbal cues.48 However, 
even though officers now have the legal right to deny a case 
on the basis of physical behaviour or verbal cues, they could 
nonetheless consider self-consciously their understanding 
of “expected” body language and human reactions and be 
sensitive to the fact that their perceptions do not necessar-
ily translate to the “normal” understandings of those from 
different countries.49 In addition, individuals who have suf-
fered trauma may be more likely to be nervous and act in 
“non-normal” ways during an asylum interview.
That is, USCIS administrators could incorporate alterna-
tive possibilities so as to see applicant body language during 
interviews as states along a range of contextually appro-
priate behaviours, rather than dichotomized alternatives. 
Thereafter, instead of viewing a fidgeting applicant, or an 
individual who is not looking an interviewer in the eye, and 
concluding the person might be a threat to state sovereignty, 
officials can humanize the asylum-seeker’s behaviours along 
a spectrum of normal. This opening up of conceptual space 
diminishes the psychological distance between the asylum-
seeker and the officer while granting a measure of defer-
ence to the petitioner. A similar example of this expansion 
of “normal” interpretations involves Western perspectives 
of gay identities. If asylum officials are able to conceive of 
sexual identity along a band of possibilities, then instead of 
pursuing lines of questioning common to Western notions, 
such as “coming out stories,” that may not be applicable to 
individuals living in societies that are extremely oppressive 
to gay individuals, officials could pursue alternate areas of 
concern without assuming that the lack of a “coming out” 
story signals fraud.50
Challenging State Subjectivity: Affective 
Imagination
The third facet of imagination that Stephenson has described, 
“affective imagination,” involves a self-awareness that allows 
individuals to discipline themselves as they relate to other 
“different” individuals while practising empathy, or “[per-
ceiving] the needs of those with whom they interact.”51 An 
officer with profound self-knowledge can confront how 
he or she constructs state subjectivities and can thereafter 
act on that knowledge and assist other decision-makers to 
develop such affective awareness and self-knowledge.
To exercise affective imagination, officers must recognize 
that the state and the refugee are discursively constructed 
and then acknowledge how USCIS officials help to create and 
perpetuate that boundary by constituting themselves as 
state. Doty has recognized the silent presence of the self in 
research and practice and contended that there is “a power 
inherent in this absence, a power that enables [officers] to 
present their work as authoritative, objective and neutral.”52 
There is an unobtrusive state subjectivity in the adjudication 
decision, through the officer’s re-authoring of the refugee 
story to accord with the state legal framework. While asylum 
decision-makers may pride themselves on their analytical 
reasoning abilities and their capacity to consider socio-
logical, psychological, legal, and other perspectives in their 
analyses of cases, their role as protectors of state sovereignty 
suggests that they are neither objective nor neutral in their 
adjudications. As Hardy, Phillips, and Clegg have argued, 
one cannot just recognize “the situatedness of knowledge.” 
Instead, “We need to develop new representational practi-
ces … that reflect on the system.”53 Ideally, this stance could 
lead to officers recognizing their state-oriented subjectivity, 
finding ways to mitigate it, and assisting asylum-seekers in 
understanding better how officers view them and why.
In short, using affective imagination could help asylum 
officials help themselves, but it could also assist other deci-
sion-makers to understand how their choices are shaped 
by state subjectivity. Officers can encourage each other to 
take advantage of opportunities for critical reflection and 
ask questions about the different influences, including the 
state’s authority, that guide them as they make their deci-
sions. As Stephenson has observed, “The significance of 
latent and rarely articulated ideas shape how engaged actors 
view their world or make sense of their environments. They 
do so, often unconsciously, on the basis of shared narratives, 
assumptions and claims. Likely, many would never express 
those unless brought to realize self-consciously their exist-
ence and contour.”54
Officers can and should undertake the effort to become 
conscious of their state-based dichotomizations and 
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assumptions. Gannon has suggested that taking time to 
ponder one’s partiality through reflective writing, perhaps 
in the spirit of autoethnography, can be useful in revealing 
the power discourses that influence one’s work: “Autoe-
thnographic writing within a poststructuralist frame leans 
toward the ancient imperative to care for the self in a con-
stant practice of reflective attention to the past, present, and 
future moments of subjectification within complex and 
contradictory discursive arenas.”55 USCIS officers might well 
benefit from experimenting with just such practices.
In addition to educating themselves and other decision-
makers concerning broadening critical and reflective think-
ing in asylum adjudications, decision-makers can practise 
empathy in order to recognize applicants’ perspectives 
and to acknowledge the fact that petitioners are unlikely 
to understand how officers create state subjectivity. This 
implies that asylum administrators must make an effort to 
educate applicants concerning the constructed character of 
the decision criteria they follow. This use of affective imagin-
ation demands empathy and it can start with assisting 
petitioners in understanding officers’ logos, i.e., making a 
personal effort to ensure “plain language” explanations of 
different legal terms that guide decisions, but that refugees 
may not understand. For example, with certain types of asy-
lum filings, USCIS officers are required to provide a decision 
to applicants after their interview. If the official does not 
find the petitioner to have a credible fear of persecution or 
torture, she must inform the individual of her decision. This 
may result in applicants protesting that they do not under-
stand why the administrator did not believe them. However, 
at the beginning of the interview, officers could instead help 
the refugee appreciate that they are truly listening to their 
stories and recognize that they may have suffered great 
trauma, but that what they are specifically adjudicating is 
whether their claim fits within state-specific definitions. If 
such were undertaken, petitioners could understand bet-
ter that officers are not seeking to invalidate their stories 
as their primary aim. Instead, they are constrained by law 
concerning how to interpret the narrative they hear.
Practising empathy could also include making a personal 
effort to ensure the petitioner understands the ethos of asy-
lum officers. In effect, USCIS officials could help applicants 
grasp Western morality and how this shapes decision-
making concerning their cases. For example, when officers 
ask petitioners many detailed questions about fraud and 
national security, they can inform petitioners that these are 
routine questions they ask all applicants, that they do con-
sider fraud and national security issues, but that these con-
cerns are just one part of the interview and that they are not 
singling them out. Additionally, administrators can explain 
that they recognize that structural violence or a complex 
array of interrelated factors, including economic concerns, 
could contribute to why the applicant experienced or might 
encounter harm in his country. Nonetheless, they are tasked 
with determining whether petitioner claims represent pro-
tected concerns as specified in United States law.
Challenging State Subjectivity: Moral Imagination
Finally, Stephenson has suggested that “moral imagination” 
is “inevitably linked to commons-related claims demanding 
that its practitioner act on behalf of a collectivity beyond 
self.”56 USCIS officers may enact moral imagination by mak-
ing a conscious effort to practise cosmopolitan thinking 
in adjudications and employing techniques that do not 
“replace the nation state [ideology] but instead integrate 
it.”57 Instead of conceiving of themselves as simply U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security officials, officers could 
view themselves as wearers of multiple hats with respon-
sibility for keeping the nation secure from external threats, 
but also as working in partnership with asylum decision-
makers around the world to ensure that eligible refugees 
are granted safe haven. That is, officials can avoid regard-
ing petitioners solely within a United States–centred view 
and instead think of why/how refugees are created in the 
first place and why America subscribes to international law 
regarding this population. They could consider how their 
individual decisions affect an interconnected web of people 
and legitimize the refugee protection system as a whole. 
From this perspective, officials could consider applicants 
not just as individuals from another nation who represent 
a potential threat to the United States, but instead as people 
like themselves who have families, hopes, and dreams, who 
have allegedly undergone trauma, and who may in fact be a 
future neighbour or friend.
Multivocality may be used as a tool to realize this form 
of cosmopolitan thinking. Within the context of researcher 
(asylum officer, in this case) and research subject (refugee[s]) 
interaction, “multivocality can (a) highlight power differ-
ences in a research scenario between the researcher and 
participants, (b) encourage the researcher to consider how 
competing aspects of her or his identity shape relationships, 
and (c) expose underlying research vulnerabilities or ten-
sions.”58 If officers employed multivocality during asylum 
adjudications, it could allow them to consider a case from 
multiple perspectives, including their personal identities 
as well as those of fellow neighbours or family members 
and so on, in addition to the state’s stipulations. So, for 
example, in lieu of an administrator opening a file from a 
country known to have a high incidence of terrorist activity 
and automatically supposing that the person before them 
represents a potential threat to national security, or instead 
of picking up case documents from a nation belonging to a 
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visa category that has a high incidence of fraud and assum-
ing that this new application will also be fraudulent, the 
official can begin review of the file by asking, how can I best 
ensure protection of this applicant from individuals in his 
country who may be persecuting him, and how can I effect-
ively ensure protection of this individual? This orientation 
integrates the nation-state system as a tool through which to 
dignify, humanize, and value individual applicants, while 
at the same time recognizing the officer’s need to conduct 
thorough security checks.
Employing moral imagination through cosmopolitan 
thinking and multivocality can start with something as 
simple as sharing and drinking water with the applicant, or 
chatting before the interview about love for family, to cre-
ate a human-level connection, instead of countenancing a 
formal and de facto adversarial relationship. As Doty has 
contended, asylum officials need to connect to the human 
beings and not just the objects of the state.59 This idea of 
connectedness “goes against the grain of traditional empiri-
cism, which assumes that the knower and the known inhabit 
disconnected worlds.”60 Instead, this notion of relatedness 
requires greater depth of understanding and feeling about 
those about whom decision-makers write.61 It involves 
recognizing one’s own vulnerability, and feeling the horror 
and sadness in the applicant stories, and not viewing peti-
tioners as just another case to process. This orientation also 
demands imagining claimants as a potential U.S. citizen. 
Similarly, it requires increased engagement with applicants 
and understanding of the asylum officer as an individual wit-
ness to refugee experiences. It requires official cognizance 
that all applicants deserve compassion. This stance involves 
not simply seeking to see the petitioner’s story from the 
perspective of the asylum seeker, or trying as an officer to 
put herself in the applicant’s shoes, but a willingness to be 
vulnerable to feelings during exchanges with petitioners.
Conclusion
Examining how asylum officials define refugee identities at 
the micro-level can supplement high-level policy analysis 
regarding the role and function of the state in humanitarian 
protection for refugees. U.S. asylum officers decide whether 
applicants should receive protection. The refugee officials’ 
understanding of who qualifies as an asylee is enmeshed 
with their regime’s power to determine who belongs within 
the sovereign realm and who does not. The USCIS officer 
simulates this state power through professionalization, or 
representing national ethos, through morality conditioning, 
or regime pathos, and also through formal legal interpreta-
tions, or exemplifying state logos.
Since protecting the sovereign realm is central to the dut-
ies of an asylum officer, fraud and national security concerns 
cannot and should not be ignored in status decisions. None-
theless, state power creates “refugees.” Asylum officers are 
often conditioned only to recognize their role as according 
legal recognition from the state in the form of asylum. As 
a result, de-centring to reflect critically on the role of the 
government in the categorization and subsequent adjudica-
tion of refugees is necessary.62 If officials do not consciously 
recognize, consider, and counter regime subjectivities, 
asylum applicants are likely to be seen as fact patterns and 
threats to state sovereignty. None of this is to suggest that 
other stakeholders in the process do not question regime 
criteria concerning asylum and otherwise work to ensure 
due process for claimants. Rather, it is to suggest only that 
asylum officers are positioned to accept and apply state law 
and assumptions rather than daily to inquire searchingly 
into them. What is at stake in this process for the state is 
the assurance of due process and a “fair hearing” for asylum 
seekers, even as against delimited criteria, and a clear role 
for the asylum officer that can at once help to secure that 
result and to allow these state actors space for considered 
understanding of their complex roles.
As officials listen to individual stories of displacement, 
they can protect national borders and simultaneously 
dignify refugees by employing forms of imagination to 
confront their own state-centred subjectivity and bias. Indi-
vidual officers can and should be trained and encouraged 
to recognize their partiality through practices of aesthetic 
imagination, cognitive imagination, affective imagination, 
and moral imagination. They can extend their focus to 
envisioning complex realities and symbols in applicant nar-
ratives, broadening frames through reflective and critical 
thinking, practising empathy, and sensitizing other officers 
and applicants to their state-constructed subjectivity. These 
practices can help officers recognize and uncover their 
biases and help them identify fraud and national security 
threats while also upholding the United States govern-
ment’s ideals of human rights and freedom from oppression. 
Employing these forms of imagination can decrease the 
distance between asylum interviewers and applicants and 
allow refugees a genuine opportunity to receive a full hear-
ing of their stories.63
Emily C. Barry-Murphy is an affiliate of the Virginia Tech 
Institute for Policy and Governance and she focuses her 
research on refugee regime democratization; she is interested 
in finding novel ways for refugees to have a greater voice 
in the structures that govern and define them. Although 
Dr. Barry-Murphy is program manager for one of the nine 
United States Asylum Offices and is a former Department of 
Homeland Security asylum officer, the views represented in 
Volume 31 Refuge Number 2
11
this article are her own and do not represent the views of the 
United States Government. The author may be contacted at 
emily.c.barry@gmail.com. 
Max Stephenson Jr. serves as a professor of public and inter-
national affairs and the director of the Institute for Policy 
and Governance at Virginia Tech. His research and teaching 
interests include refugees and human rights, NGOs and inter-
national development, and peacebuilding and humanitarian 
relief. The author may be contacted at mstephen@vt.edu. 
Notes
 1 For more on the historical evolution of U.S. immigra-
tion and asylum law, see April Shemak, Asylum Speakers: 
Caribbean Refugees and Testimonial Discourse (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2011): 5–8.
 2 Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips, and Stewart Clegg, 
“Reflexivity in Organization and Management Theory: A 
Study of the Production of the Research ‘Subject,’” Human 
Relations 54 (2001): 541.
 3 Ulrich Beck, Twenty Observations on a World in Turmoil 
(Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2012), 135.
 4 Ibid., 137.
 5 Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the 
State and Symbolic Exchange (New York: Press Syndicate 
of the University of Cambridge, 2005).
 6 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings, 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. 
Colin Gordon, Leo Marshal, John Mepham, and Kate 
Sober (New York: Pantheon, 1980). In Weber, Simulating 
Sovereignty, 33.
 7 Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, 34.
 8 Ibid.
 9 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila 
Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). In 
Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty.
 10 Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, 6.
 11 Ibid.
 12 Ibid., 28.
 13 Hardy, Phillips, and Clegg, “Reflexivity in Organization 
and Management Theory,” 532.
 14 Ibid.
 15 Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman, Rejecting Refugees: Pol-
itical Asylum in the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 1.
 16 Philip Schrag, A Well-Founded Fear: The Congressional 
Battle to Save Political Asylum in America (New York: 
Routledge Publishers, 2000). 
 17 Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, “Reflexivity in Organization 
and Management Theory,” 542.
 18 Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: Failed Governance 
and the Crisis of Displacement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2013).
 19 Juliet Stumpf, “Introduction,” in Social Control and Jus-
tice Crimmigration in the Age of Fear, ed., Maartje van 
der Woude, and Joanne van der Leun, 7–16 (The Hague: 
Eleven International Publishing, 2013); César Cuauhtémoc 
Garcia Hernández, “Creating Crimmigration,” Brigham 
University Law Review 6 (2013): 1457–1515.
 20 April Shemak, Asylum Speakers: Caribbean Refugees and 
Testimonial Discourse (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2011).
 21 Bohmer and Shuman, Rejecting Refugees, 16.
 22 United States Department of State, Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 2013: United Kingdom 2013 
Human Rights Report (Washington, DC: Bureau of Dem-
ocracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013), 6.
 23 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Mat-
ter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014).
 24 Bohmer and Shuman, Rejecting Refugees, 6.
 25 Amy Grenier, “Landmark Decision on Asylum Claims  
Recognizes Domestic Violence Victims,” Immigration 
Impact, 2 September 2014, http://immigrationimpact.
com/2014/09/02/landmark-decision-on-asylum-claims-
recognizes-domestic-violence-victims/. 
 26 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: 
Between Sovereigns (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2013), 2.
 27 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asy-
lum Officer Basic Training—Decision Writing Part II: Legal 
Analysis (Washington, DC: Refugee, Asylum and Inter-
national Operations Asylum Division, 2006), 4.
 28 Carrie Dawson, “On Thinking Like a State and Reading 
(about) Refugees,” Journal of Canadian Studies 45, no. 2 
(2011): 61.
 29 Andrew Schoenholtz, Philip Schrag, and Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Lives in the Balance: Asylum Adjudication by the 
Department of Homeland Security (New York: New York 
University Press, 2014), 208–11. 
 30 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip 
Scrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudica-
tion and Proposals for Reform (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 2011).
 31 Dawson, “On Thinking Like a State and Reading (about) 
Refugees,” 62.
 32 Katrina Powell, “Rhetorics of Displacement: Constructing 
Identities in Forced Relocations,” College English 74 (2012): 
302.
 33 Nandita Sharma, “Canadian Nationalism and the Making 
of a Global Apartheid,” Women and Environment 68–9 
(2005): 9. In Dawson, “On Thinking Like a State and Read-
ing (about) Refugees,” 69.
 34 Dawson, “On Thinking Like a State and Reading (about) 
Refugees,” 69.
 35 Powell, “Rhetorics of Displacement,” 318.
 36 The United Nations Refugee Agency and the European 
Refugee Fund of the European Commission, Beyond 
Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems (Brus-
sels: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
2013), 39.
Volume 31 Refuge Number 2
12
 37 Dawson, “On Thinking Like a State and Reading (about) 
Refugees,” 64–70.
 38 Davina Bhandar, “Renormalizing Citizenship and Life 
in Fortress North America,” Citizenship Studies 8, no. 3 
(2004): 275. In Dawson, “On Thinking Like a State and 
Reading (about) Refugees,” 64.
 39 Max Stephenson, Jr., “Exploring the Connections among 
Adaptive Leadership, Facets of Imagination and Social 
Imaginaries,” Public Policy and Administration 24, no. 4 
(2009): 417–35.
 40 Ibid., 424.
 41 Maxine Greene, Releasing the Imagination: Essays on Edu-
cation, the Arts, and Social Change (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass Publishers, 1995), 19. In Stephenson, “Exploring the 
Connections among Adaptive Leadership,” 424.
 42 Stephenson, “Exploring the Connections among Adaptive 
Leadership,” 426.
 43 Roland Bleiker, Aesthetics and World Politics (Rethinking 
Peace and Conflict Studies) (New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2009).
 44 John Wilson and Boris Drozdek, eds., Broken Spirits: The 
Treatment of Traumatized Asylum Seekers, Refugees, War 
and Torture Victims (New York: Brunner-Routledge Pub-
lishers, 2004); Claudia Tazreiter, Asylum Seekers and the 
State: The Politics of Protection in a Security Conscious 
World (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), espe-
cially 189–210. 
 45 Bleiker, Aesthetics and World Politics, 427.
 46 Ibid.
 47 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(a)
(3), amending new INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), codified at 8 USC 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
 48 Audrey Macklin, “Truth and Consequences: Credibility  
Determination in the Refugee Context,” in International 
Association of Refugee Law Judges Conference, 134–40 
(Ottawa: International Association of Refugee Law Judges, 
1998).
 49 Cécile Rousseau, François Crépeau, Patricia Foxen, and 
France Houle, “The Complexity of Determining Refugee-
hood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-mak-
ing Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee 
Board,” Journal of Refugee Studies 15, no. 4 (2002): 43–70.
 50 Rachel Lewis, “Lesbians under Surveillance: Same-Sex 
Immigration Reform, Gay Rights, and the Problem of 
Queer Liberalism,” Social Justice: A Journal of Crime, Con-
flict, and World Order 37, no. 1 (2010): 90–106.
 51 Stephenson, “Exploring the Connections among Adaptive 
Leadership,” 428.
 52 Roxanne Doty, “Autoethnography: Making Human Con-
nections,” Review of International Studies 36 (2010): 1048.
 53 Hardy, Phillips, and Clegg, “Reflexivity in Organization 
and Management Theory,” 555.
 54 Stephenson, “Exploring the Connections among Adaptive 
Leadership,” 423.
 55 Susanne Gannon, “The (Im)Possibilities of Writing the 
Self-Writing: French Poststructural Theory and Autoe-
thnography,” Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies 6 
(2006): 480.
 56 Stephenson, “Exploring the Connections among Adaptive 
Leadership,” 429.
 57 Beck, Twenty Observation on a World in Turmoil, 137.
 58 Robert Mizzi, “Unraveling Researcher Subjectivity 
through Multivocality in Autoethnography,” Journal of 
Research Practice 6 (2010): 7.
 59 Doty, “Autoethnography,” 1048.
 60 Michael Jackson, Paths toward a Clearing: Radical Empiri-
cism and Ethnographic Inquiry (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989), cited in Caroline Ellis, “Emotional 
and Ethical Quagmires in Returning to the Field,” Journal 
of Contemporary Ethnography 24 (1995): 94.
 61 Ruth Behar, The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology That 
Breaks your Heart (Boston: Beacon, 1997), 165.
 62 Michel Agier, Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps 
and Humanitarian Government, trans. David Fernbach 
(Malden, MA: Polity, 2011).
 63 The lead author of this article has designed and success-
fully offered a training program for fifty asylum officers at 
a DHS-USCIS regional office based on the argument offered 
here. Division leaders have expressed interest in provid-
ing the workshop to additional asylum decision-makers at 
other offices. 
Volume 31 Refuge Number 2
13

